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**MTFA National Working Group**

**USAR National Working Group - Briefing Note**

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| **Agenda Item Number** |  | **Date** |  |
| **Kerslake Report: Fire and Rescue Service Actions** | | | |

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| **Summary** | | |
| Following the Manchester Arena attack on 22nd May 2017; Andy Burnham (Metro Mayor of Greater Manchester) initiated a review into the response. A panel was assembled chaired by Lord Bob Kerslake, the former Head of the Civil Service. The panel’s task was to identify both what went well following the attack in addition to major issues for learning. The subsequent findings of that review were published 27th March 2018 and are referred to within what has become known as the ***Kerslake Report.***  Within the report are a series of recommendations specifically categorised into ’themes’:   * Local Multi-Agency Recommendations * Fire and Rescue Services Recommendations * Greater Manchester Police Recommendations * National Emergency Response Recommendations * Press and Media in Emergencies   On first reading it may appear that the recommendations for the Fire and Rescue Service are solely contained within the Fire and Rescue Services’ section of the report; however, further analysis has shown clear commonality within areas associated with interoperability and partner working that are fundamental at major incidents such as this. Consequently, this report seeks to summarise all recommendations considered relevant and present them for discussion and ratification via the NFCC Operations Coordination Committee.  The recommendations are presented in tabular format under the following headings:   * Fire and Rescue Service Recommendations * Multi-Agency Recommendations   To ensure a broader Fire and Rescue Service context is presented; some of the original wording from the Kerslake Report has been amended to reflect the intent to address the recommendation within the Fire and Rescue Service nationally. Such amendments are shown in the wording of the recommendation in ***red bold italics*.**  The Manchester response is being conducted through the Local Resilience Forum. No Government department is taking responsibility for any of the recommendations so there is a need to co-ordinate between –   * Manchester LRF Response * JESIP multi-agency work * FRS specific recommendations * Review of MTFA Joint Operating Principles (JOP) | | |
| **Contacts** | **Phone Number** | **Email** | |
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| **Reference Documents** | **Reference Number** |
| ***The Kerslake Report: An independent review into the preparedness for, and emergency response to, the Manchester Arena attack on 22nd May 2017*** | Published 27th March 2018 |

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| **Fire and Rescue Service Recommendations** | | | | |
| **No** | **Kerslake Report Recommendation** | **Date Opened** | **Progress update** | **Date Closed** |
| 01 | Whilst the Panel acknowledges that Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and North West Fire Control have made alterations to the role of the National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer and Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA) protocols for terrorist-related and suspected terrorist-related incidents; ***FRS and their respective control rooms*** should test and further review these protocols to ensure they will be effective and always allocate a ‘command structure’ to the incident and a National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer to act as Tactical Advisor to the incident commander (Ref 5.166 of the report). | 27th March 2018 | NFCC NILO position statement agreed at the Operations Coordination Committee 18th April Review of MTFA ConOps and NOG initiated to remove any reference to the NILO in a command role. |  |
| 02 | All Fire and Rescue Services utilising ***multi-service/multi agency Control*** as their call management and resolution service should review their service level agreements and build resilient contingencies and capabilities within **their control** to enhance the development of multi-agency shared situational awareness, which can most effectively inform their Fire Service command, control and coordination during no-notice major incidents (Ref 5.212 of report). |  |  |  |
| 03 | All ***FRS operational personnel*** should be sufficiently trained and equipped to attend a nominated multi agency rendezvous point during terrorist-related and suspected terrorist related incidents (Ref 5.212 of report). |  |  |  |
| 04 | ***FRS in collaboration with their respective control rooms***; should revise their policies and procedures (including action plans) for Bomb, Explosion and Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack to ensure that greater emphasis is placed on multi-agency co-location, communication and coordination (Ref 5.212 of report). |  |  |  |
| 05 | ***FRS*** should review the procedures, protocols and expectations that underpin communications links between its Inter- Agency Liaison Officers, ***Police Force Duty Officers*** and other partners’ control rooms and critical response assets (e.g. Hazardous Area Response Teams) (Ref 5.212 of report). | 27th March 2018 | NFCC NILO position statement agreed at the Operations Coordination Committee 18th April Review of MTFA ConOps and NOG initiated to remove any reference to the NILO in a command role. |  |
| 06 | The National Fire Chiefs’ Council and ***FRS*** should revise all policies, procedures and training for National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers and Incident Commanders to ensure that greater emphasis is placed on embedding multi-agency co-location, communication and coordination during major incidents into standard operating procedures (Ref 5.212 of report). | 27th March 2018 | NFCC NILO position statement agreed at the Operations Coordination Committee 18th April Review of MTFA ConOps and NOG initiated to remove any reference to the NILO in a command role. |  |
| 07 | All agencies and specifically ***the FRS*** need to ensure a suitable level of competence and experience is underpinned by relevant training and preparation in multi-agency command, control and communication for all their relevant staff to ensure effective responses are delivered when normal or more extraordinary events happen (Ref 5.212 of report). |  |  |  |

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| **Multi-Agency Recommendations** | | | | |
| **No** | **Kerslake Report Recommendation** | **Date Opened** | **Progress update** | **Date Closed** |
| 08 | Potential Strategic Coordinating Group Chairs should pursue a clear objective to undertake a Strategic Coordinating Group update briefing (physically or virtually) within two hours of the declaration of a major incident (Ref 5.43 of report). |  |  |  |
| 09 | ***Local*** Resilience Forum members should investigate ways to increase their own personnel’s understandings of their partner agencies’ procedures and operational priorities during the first 30 minutes to one hour of a major incident (Ref 5.73 of report). |  |  |  |
| 10 | All emergency services should consider developing a capability to give their staff rapid access to basic frameless canvas stretchers to enable rapid movement and evacuation of casualties during terrorist attacks or other high-threat or dynamic-hazard incidents (Ref 5.88 of report). |  |  |  |
| 11 | All planning assumptions and training in respect of preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks in public places should include realistic contingencies for public involvement in casualty care, treatment and evacuation within all incident zones (Ref 5.115 of report). |  |  |  |
| 12 | ***Local*** Resilience Forum members should clarify their joint operating procedures in relation to the declaration of multi-agency  forward control points, rendezvous points and marshalling arrangements during terrorist incidents and suspected terrorist incidents (Ref 5.172 of report). |  |  |  |
| 13 | All Local Resilience Fora should review their planning assumptions and expectations in relation to multi-agency communications during major incidents. Emphasis should be placed on identifying potential single points of failure in communication networks (i.e. technological and command) and building in resilience and/or alternative contingencies to avoid such failures (Ref 5.212 of report). |  |  |  |
| 14 | ***Local*** Resilience Forum members should  develop contingencies to enable METHANE messages to be shared directly between partner agencies’ control rooms immediately upon receipt of a message from the incident scene (Ref 5.212 of report). |  |  |  |
| 15 | ***Local*** Resilience Forum members should adopt the common understanding of specific terms and phrases which impact on multi-agency working that is defined within the Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology (e.g. rendezvous point, forward command point, holding area) (ref 5.212 of report). |  |  |  |
| 16 | ***Local*** Resilience Forum members should conduct a review of their planning assumptions in relation to multi-agency working, up to and including scenarios for all plausible worst-case major incidents (Ref 5.212 of report. |  |  |  |
| 17 | The response to the Arena attack provided an extraordinary validation of the on-going work within the UK civil protection sector to embed the JESIP Interoperability Framework into practice. Where responders were able rapidly to co-locate, communicate and coordinate their activities, situational awareness was usefully shared, risks were jointly assessed, and pragmatic solutions were developed to mitigate severe, time critical, challenges. Where unforeseen limitations in guidance, protocol and circumstance collided to block such close collaboration, the response of the organisation affected was paralysed for a crucial period. Accordingly, it is the Panel’s belief that the findings of the Review should provide a critical stimulus for responders nationally to reassess all plans and protocols that include assumptions of interoperability during major incidents, for the response to the Arena attack provides undeniable evidence that such assumptions need to be vigorously tested (Ref 5.212 of report). |  |  |  |
| 18 | Operation PLATO should be reviewed and modified as deemed necessary to inform the response to any form of terrorist attack and be referred to as the Joint Operating Principles for Responding to a Terrorist Attack, regardless of whether firearms are thought to be involved (Ref 5.231 of report). |  |  |  |
| 19 | A national review of the possibility of accrediting charities to deliver effective services in the response to an emergency should be undertaken, avoiding the accreditation process becoming too burdensome for the charities concerned but including a requirement to plan with Local Resilience Fora ahead of emergencies (Ref 5.243 of report). |  |  |  |
| 20 | Emergency plans for major incidents should incorporate comprehensive contingencies for the provision of mental health support to adults, children and young people, families and responders (Ref 5.254 of report). |  |  |  |
| 21 | First response agencies and local authorities should review the resources available to their Press Offices in response to a major incident and consider whether adequate arrangements are in place to flex capacity quickly if further support is needed to deal with the demands of the media. This could be done by mobilising mutual aid from other Police Forces and partner organisations, including academic institutions with particular experience of social network messaging and communication. Consideration should also be given to allocating sufficient dedicated press handlers at key sites (Ref 5.266 of report). |  |  |  |
| 22 | Operators of all key/iconic sites should be actively encouraged and enabled to participate in Local Resilience Forum planning, training and exercising (Ref 5.273 of report). |  |  |  |
| 23 | All agencies should be minded to explore the use of encrypted social media in improving their internal emergency activation arrangements, together with their internal communication systems for updating staff during an emergency (Ref 5.287 of report). |  |  |  |